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I. INTRODUCTION
characteristic of the Turkish Constitutional Court is its open access to the
parliamentary opposition and its high degree of independence from the
executive branch of government. This paper will show that in Turkey con-
stitutional review provides opportunities for the parliamentary opposition to com-
pensate for its legislative weakness. In other words, constitutional review is the
opposition’s second chance to defeat some of the government’s bills.
A. Political Background
Transition to a multiparty system in 1946. The political background for the intro-
duction of constitutional review in Turkey can at least be dated back to an earlier
attempt at democratization immediately after the Second World War. In the 1946
general election Turkey made a transition to a multiparty system from the one-
party system dominated by the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk
Partisi; hereafter RPP) founded by Kemal Atatürk. The electoral outcome gave the
governing RPP a bare majority to remain in office, but in the following 1950 gen-
eral election the RPP had to give way to the emerging Democratic Party (Demokrat
Parti; hereafter DP), which had originated from a splinter group that broke off from
the RPP.
Tyranny of the majority ends in a coup. Turkey’s democratization attempt, while
bringing about a change of governing parties, did not engender institutionalized
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relations between the government and opposition. The DP, which won consecutive
general elections in 1954 and 1957, grew increasingly authoritarian (as well as
anti-secular) while in government and began to use repression on the parliamentary
and extra-parliamentary opposition, especially on the RPP.1  The political turmoil
culminated in 1960 when student-led protest movements prompted the DP govern-
ment to declare martial law in Istanbul and Ankara. In Ankara the army cadets
joined the anti-government demonstration. The government ordered the military to
fire on the demonstrators, but it refused and instead toppled the government in a
coup.
Shared constitution-making. The military temporarily ruled Turkey from 1960
to 1961 during which time it participated with civilians in the process of drafting a
new constitution. The bicameral Constitutional Assembly, composed of equipotent
military and civilian chambers, was created in 1960. Members of the civilian
chamber (Assembly of Representatives) were put into office by indirect election,
cooptation, or quota, and they represented various functional groups as well as
political parties excluding the banned DP. When the military chamber (National
Unity Committee) did not entirely approve of the text of a bill which the civilian
chamber had passed, or when the civilian chamber did not approve of the changes
which the military chamber made to a bill’s original text, the Constitutional As-
sembly would hold a joint session to vote on the text. Since the civilian chamber
had more members than the military chamber, the former held the advantage in
such voting [5, p. 31].
Constitutional rule against majority tyranny. The 1961 constitution was formu-
lated in reaction to the DP era when the government was able to infringe upon the
supremacy of the constitution and basic human rights. The 1961 constitution was
distinct from the previous 1924 constitution because of the relative importance it
placed on the following. First, the notion of democracy shifted from majority rule
to pluralism. The 1961 constitution advocated pluralistic democracy based on the
principles of (1) the supremacy of the constitution, (2) the separation of powers and
a system of checks and balances, and (3) the structural development of a pluralistic
society. Second, it also sought to expand and to strengthen basic human rights.
Third, the concept of social state held the state responsible for securing social
peace and justice while also justifying active intervention by the state in the social
and economic activities of the nation [5, pp. 17–22]. This constitution has been
regarded as the most liberal in Turkish history.
It was this constitution that for the first time in Turkey adopted constitutional
review and established the Constitutional Court. The major features of Turkish
1 The DP government confiscated an important part of the RPP’s real estate in December 1953,
modified law on press to increase control over newspapers in June 1956, and banned RPP activities
for three months in April 1960.
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constitutional review, as will be elaborated later, are the practice of abstract (be-
sides concrete) review and the referral powers given to the major part of the parlia-
mentary opposition. In the case of abstract review, the parliamentary opposition
can ask the Constitutional Court to annul a constitutionally dubious bill which the
governing party passed in Parliament. A resultant nullity decision by the court
would not only embarrass the incumbent government but in some cases could force
it to modify, if not revamp, its policy.
Political instability and a new constitution. The 1961 constitution, however, sur-
vived for no more than two decades. In the late 1970s political violence between
the right and left escalated. The military in September 1980 intervened and de-
clared martial law nationwide.  The military detected defects in the 1961 constitu-
tion which it said had led to a divided Parliament and weak governments as well as
to political violence associated with proliferating political groups and trade unions.
The new leadership then monopolized the drawing up and promulgation of a new
1982 constitution. In the new bicameral Constitutional Assembly, the military
chamber (National Security Council) had the power to reject or amend the text
which the civilian chamber (Consultative Assembly) had approved, and those re-
jections or amendments did not have to be sent back for review to the civilian
chamber [5, p. 31].
In comparison with the 1961 constitution, the 1982 constitution (1) was more
casuistic or specific in details, (2) was more difficult to change, (3) was more tran-
sitional or temporary, (4) shifted the balance between authority and freedom to-
wards the former, (5) strengthened the executive branch of government, (6)
avoided deadlocks in the political decision-making mechanism, and (7) was less
lenient towards participatory democracy [5, pp. 35–44]. In sum, the 1982 constitu-
tion was designed to support a strong central government at the expense of the
greater political freedom envisaged in the previous constitution.
Institutional continuities. Given all restrictive clauses included in the 1982 con-
stitution, the general structure of the 1961 constitution remained in tact and almost
all of the pre-1980 legislative, executive, and judiciary institutions resumed func-
tioning after transition to civilian rule in 1983.  Constitutional review also has been
exercised under the 1982 constitution. The powers of referral became more limited
than those under the 1961 constitution, but they are still wider than most such pow-
ers provided for in European constitutional reviews (see below).
B. Empirical Approach to Constitutional Review
Legal approach. Research into constitutional review in Turkey, as in other coun-
tries until recently, has been mostly concerned with normative issues in legal stud-
ies. Most of the literature in Turkey either has introduced normative theories or
models of judicial review to explain the Turkish system in those terms or has com-
pared Turkey with other countries in terms of institutional characteristics of consti-
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tutional review.2 While it might be successful in its own right, this literature has
rarely investigated how the Turkish system has functioned in practice.
Political-science approach. Outside of Turkey, political scientists recently have
come to recognize their lack of research into judicial review. Their new-found in-
terest in judicial review, and in constitutional review in particular, apparently stems
from the scholarly interest in judicial policymaking or the judiciary as a
policymaker [12] [6] [11]. The court, however, does not play an active role out of
its own will. In the case of constitutional review, the activism of the court depends
primarily on the extent of access to constitutional review and of judicial indepen-
dence.
Institutional characteristics. In brief the major institutional characteristics of
Turkish constitutional review include (1) the practice of abstract and concrete re-
view, (2) access to review by the largest opposition parliamentary group3 and one-
fifth of the members of Parliament as well as the president and the prime minister,
and (3) the relative independence of the judiciary which dominates the appoint-
ment process of the judges. While constitutional review is by definition exercised
over the legislation of Parliament, in parliamentary systems as like that in Turkey,
the Constitutional Court in practice can pass judgment on the decisions of the ex-
ecutive branch of government which in effect controls the legislature.
Abstract review. Constitutional review in general consists of concrete review
and abstract review. In the former the Constitutional Court reviews the constitu-
tionality of the law as applied to actual cases while in the latter the court reviews
the constitutionality of the law directly. It is through abstract review that the oppo-
sition can challenge government legislations. Table I shows those European coun-
tries where abstract judicial review was exercised as of 1990. In Turkey, where
both concrete and abstract review is exercised a posteriori, referral for abstract
review can be made within sixty days after the law is put into effect. The Constitu-
tional Court can nullify the whole or part of the law, reject the referral, or sparingly
decide that no decision needs to be made.  The decision of the Constitutional Court
comes into effect on the day the decision, supplemented with a statement of rea-
sons, is published in the official gazette.4
Access. The leader of the largest opposition parliamentary group and one-fifth of
the parliamentarians as well as the leader of the governing parliamentary group,
2 See, for a recent example, Kaboâglu [2].
3 Parliamentary groups are the formal unit of legislative activities in the Turkish Parliament as is
generally the case in other parliamentary systems. (Strictly speaking, the literal translation of
“parliamentary group” in Turkey is “political party group.”) Parliamentary posts as well as time in
the General Assembly will be allocated to parliamentary groups in proportion to the number of
seats each group holds.
4 Out of the total of ten court decisions in 1990, for instance, five decisions were published in the
official gazette by the year which followed the year of referral [10, 1992 and 1993 editions].
TABLE I
STRUCTURE AND MANDATE OF EUROPEAN COURTS THAT EXERCISE “ABSTRACT” REVIEW
France (1958) W. Germany (1951) Austria (1920/1945) Spain (1980) Turkey (1962)
Anayasa Mahkemesi
11
President (11)
Until 65 years
of age
Candidates for 9 posts
are nominated by
and from the courts
and by the education
council  from
universities; two are
public officials or
lawyers
President
Prime minister
Major opposition
1/5 of Parliamentb
Corte
Constitucional
12
Congress (4)
Senate (4)
Govt. (2)
Judiciary (2)
9 years
All must be judges,
lawyers, or law
professors with
at least 15 years
experience
Prime minister
Pres. of Parliament
50 deputies
50 senators
Executives
Autonomous
region
Verfassungsgericht-
shof
14
Federal govt. (8)
Nationalrat (3)
Bundesrat (3)
Until 70 years
of age
8/14 must be judges
functionaries, or
law professors;
others must be
lawyers or politi-
cal scientists
Fed. govt.
Länder govts.
1/3 Nationalrat
1/3 lower houses
of Länder
Bundesverfassung-
sgericht
16
Bundestag (8)
Bundesrat (8)
12 years
6/16 must be
federal judges;
others must be
qualified to be
German judges
Fed. govt.
Länder govts.
1/3 of Bundestag
Conseil
Constitutionnela
9
President (3)
Pres. of the National
Assembly (3)
Pres. of the
Senate (3)
9 years
None
President
Pres. of the National
Assembly
Pres. of the Senate
60 deputies
60 senators
Institution
Number of members
Appointing
authorities
Length of term
Requisite
qualifications
Referring authorities
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TABLE I (Continued)
France (1958) W. Germany (1951) Austria (1920/1945) Spain (1980) Turkey (1962)
A priori review
A posteriori review
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Noc
Yes
No
Yes
Sources: Adopted from Stone [7, p. 45, Table 4.1]; Turkish Constitution.
Note: Excluding Portugal where the Constitutional Court was established in 1983.  The institutional characteristics of constitutional review
listed here are as of 1990.
a The Constitutional Council of France, which exercises constitutional review, functions in practice more as a judiciary rather than as a
legislative body.
b The 1982 constitution changed the previous bicameral national legislature to a unicameral one in order to hasten the legislative process.
c Abolished in 1985.
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who is usually the prime minister, and the president have the right to appeal to the
court (Turkish Constitution; hereafter TC, Article 150). Since the prime ministers
have never and the presidents have rarely opened a suit over the constitutionality of
laws, it is the opposition forces (either the largest opposition party or one-fifth of
the parliamentarians, usually in opposition) that have made the most of constitu-
tional review in Turkey. In terms of access, Turkish constitutional review is more
open to the opposition’s appeals than are the German and Austrian counterparts,
where a ratio of one-third of the members of the relevant legislature is required,  but
is less open than are the French and Spanish review processes; the required ratio of
member of the relevant legislature is 60/577 for the French lower house and 60/319
for the upper house, while it is 50/350 and 50/208 for the Spanish lower and upper
houses, respectively (see Table I).
Relative independence. The relative independence of the Constitutional Court
vis-à-vis the executive and the legislative branches of government can be discerned
by the recruitment and tenure of the members of the court and by the requisite
qualifications for membership. In European countries excluding Turkey it is either
the executive branch of government or the legislature, controlled by the govern-
ment party,5 that appoints the members. In either case, it is the party in power that
ultimately decides the members who fill the vacancies. In Turkey, however, none
of the political parties play any institutional role in the appointment process of the
Constitutional Court.
In Turkey all the eleven regular and four substitute members of the Constitu-
tional Court are appointed by the president, whose political independence is consti-
tutionally guaranteed.6 However, the president’s authority to appoint court mem-
bers is restricted in that he must (1) choose seven of the eleven regular members
and all of the four substitute members from candidates nominated by and from the
judges of the higher courts,7 with three candidates nominated for each of the seven
regular and four substitute posts, and (2) choose an eighth member from three can-
didate who are law professors nominated by the Higher Education Council; only
for the remaining three posts can the president appoint bureaucrats or lawyers at his
own discretion (TC, Article 146). Once appointed a Constitutional Court member
keeps his post until the retirement age of sixty-five, unless convicted of an offense
which terminates his position in the legal profession or because of ill health (TC,
Article 147).
5 All the countries in Table I are parliamentary democracies, in which the governing party or parties
control(s) in general the majority of the legislature.
6 “The President-elect, if a member of a party, shall sever his relations with his party and his status as
a member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall cease” (TC, Article 101) [1, p. 46].
7 They are the High Court of Appeals (2), the Council of State (2), the Military High Court of
Appeals (1), the High Military Administrative Court (1), and the Audit Court (1); the number in the
parentheses indicating the number of posts allocated for that court.
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The above institutional characteristics of the Turkish Constitutional Court have
guaranteed it a high degree of independence. As one leading Turkish legal scholar
commented:
In its history of more than a quarter of a century, the Turkish Constitutional Court has
displayed a very high degree of independence vis-à-vis the legislative and the executive
branches. Both the extent of its powers and the independence accorded to it by the Con-
stitution make the Turkish Constitutional Court one of the strongest in Europe and an
effective guarantee for the supremacy of the constitution. [4, p. 206]
In sum, Turkish constitutional review exercised by the highly independent Con-
stitutional Court in effect invalidates the governing party’s/parties’ numerical ad-
vantage in legislation and opens a rare opportunity for the parliamentary opposition
to restrain the abuse of majority power.
II. METHODOLOGY
Data. The period of this study runs from 1964 through 1993, but  the 1984–92
period was chosen for more intensive analysis for the following reasons.  First, the
data for the period of the 1961 constitution are not directly comparable with those
for the period of the 1982 constitution since the institutional conditions for consti-
tutional review as well as the contents of the constitution changed. This situation
made it more worthwhile to analyze constitutional review under the present 1982
constitution. Second, after the introduction of the 1982 constitution, there were no
cases for constitutional review in 1982 and 1983 when Parliament remained closed
down under the military government (1980–83). Third, at the time this study was
written, the latest volume of records available for intensive analysis contained data
as of 1992.
For the 1984–92 period the author recorded from Anayasa Mahkemesi kararlar
dergisi [The record of Constitutional Court decisions] [10, various issues], the
name and the review number of the law, the articles of the constitution which the
referring authority cited as reasons for referral, and the court’s decisions as well as
the reasons thereof into a computer text file. For the 1964–79 and 1993 periods the
author relied on more aggregate tabulated data prepared by the Constitutional
Court. The court kindly provided a copy of the above data to the author in August
1994.
Analysis. The author used the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) to classify all
the data into several variables and later to apply them to his statistical analysis. The
analysis examined (1) what portion of laws reviewed were nullified by the court,
(2) which referring authorities and which referral reasons brought about a larger
percentage of nullity decisions, and (3) what nullified laws were the most contro-
versial and what implication their nullification had for Turkish politics.
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III. COURT DECISIONS
A. Overview
Frequent review. There are more nullity decisions, as well as more cases of ab-
stract constitutional review, in Turkey than in other European countries where the
same review system exists. Since 1964 the Turkish Constitutional Court on an an-
nual average has handed down 12.8 decisions, out of which 61 per cent or 7.8
nullified the law (Table II).  In (West) Germany, for instance, between 1951 and
1992 there were 65 abstract reviews8 finalized, or 1.6 decisions on an annual aver-
age [3, p. 473, Table 1]. In Spain between 1981 and 1985 the annual average num-
ber of a posteriori abstract reviews was approximately 8 [7, p. 47].9
Only in France is abstract review exercised as frequently as in Turkey although
nullity decisions are fewer. Between 197410 and 1990 there were 169 cases (9.9
annually) of abstract review finalized, out of which 80 (4.7 annually) led to the
amendment of the bill [8, p. 449, Table 2]. In France, however, concrete review is
not exercised. Moreover, abstract review is exercised a priori. It would not be too
wrong to say therefore that the Constitutional Council of France, which exercises
constitutional review, functions in practice not as a judiciary but rather as a legisla-
tive body [7, p. 47]. Taking these into account, among those European countries
which have “ordinary” constitutional courts,11 Turkey stands out with the most fre-
quent reviews and nullity decisions.
Constitutional change and consistency of review. Turkey’s 1982 constitution,
which sought to strengthen the government’s authority for reasons the author ex-
plained earlier (see Subsection “Political Background” above), has restricted the
referring authorities. The 1961 constitution had granted referring power to the
president, parliamentary groups12 in either house, political parties which have par-
liamentary groups in the lower house,  political parties which obtained 10 per cent
of the valid votes in the most recent general election, one-sixth of the members of
either house, and, when it concerned their existence or duties, to the Supreme Com-
mittee of Judges, the Supreme Court, the Council of State, the Supreme Military
8 In (West) Germany constitutional review has been exercised only a posteriori.
9 The Spanish court also had the power to review a priori but that power was rescinded in 1985 since
it was considered to be an illegitimate affront to parliamentary sovereignty [7, p. 47].
10 Although constitutional review in France has been in practice since 1958, beginning in 1974 there
was a huge increase in the number of referrals, decisions, and rulings of unconstitutionality partly
because a 1974 constitutional amendment granting the right of referral to parliamentarians (al-
ready shown in Table I) radically expanded the system’s capacity to generate review [8, p. 448].
11 Those which exercise both abstract and concrete review a posteriori.
12 The 1961 constitution allowed political parties which held at least ten seats in Parliament to form a
parliamentary group whereas the 1982 constitution required twenty seats for any parliamentary
group to be formed.
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13 The 1982 constitution also brought about an institutional change from bicameralism to
unicameralism.  But the above statistical result shows that the expected tendency of unicameralism
to increase the number of referrals, since it prevents bills from being carefully scrutinized by two
chambers, was insignificant at most.
TABLE II
MEAN NUMBER OF DECISIONS BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 1964–93
Periods Nullitya Rejection Total
1964–79 (A) 8.1 6.4 14.5
1984–93 (B) 7.3 2.9 10.2
Differenceb (A − B) 0.8 3.5** 4.3*
1964–93 7.8 5.0 12.8
Source: Compiled from [10, various issues] by the author.
a Including partial nullity.
b The t-test level of significance:
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.01.
Court, and universities (TC, Article 149). The 1982 constitution limited the num-
ber of referring authorities, and the annual average number of referrals decreased
from 14.5 during the 1964–79 period to 10.2 during the 1984–93 period. The t-test,
when applied to the above data, shows that the difference between the two means
was statistically significant at a level of 0.10.13
The 1982 constitution, however, did not change the essential features of the
Turkish Constitutional Court. In the 1984–93 period, an approximate annual aver-
age of ten cases were reviewed out of which more than 70 per cent were nullified
(see Table II). This shows that Turkey still ranks the highest in Europe in the num-
ber of referrals and nullity decisions. More important is the minimal impact that the
change of constitution had on nullity decisions. The annual average number of
nullity decisions was 8.1 and 7.3 in the 1964–79 and 1984–93 periods, respec-
tively. The t-test, when applied to the above data, shows that there was no statisti-
cally significant difference between the two means. In other words, the restriction
of referring authorities under the 1982 constitution did not lead to the reduction of
nullity decisions. This shows that the reduced referrals did not hinder constitutional
review of most of the potentially unconstitutional laws.
B. Referring Authorities
In terms of referring authorities (Table III), 87.7 per cent of the laws nullified
between 1984 and 1992 had been referred by either the largest opposition parlia-
mentary group (75.5 per cent) or one-fifth of the parliamentarians (12.2 per cent),
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TABLE III
REFERRING AUTHORITIES AND THEIR RESULTS, 1984–92
Total Nullity
(A) (B)
Number % Number %
Largest opposition
parliamentary group 54 70.1 37 75.5 68.5
One-fifth of the
parliamentarians 16 20.8 6 12.2 37.5
President 7 9.1 6 12.2 85.7
Governing parliamentary
group 0 0.0 — 0.0 —
Total 77 100.0 49 100.0 63.6
Source: Compiled from [10, various issues] by the author.
Note: Entries are the numbers and percentages of laws.
Referring Authorities
 Nullity Rate
(B)/(A)
(%)
who were also in opposition.14 Constitutional review is thus mostly used by parlia-
mentary oppositions to nullify government-sponsored laws. This is mainly due to
the large number of referrals from the opposition and its relatively high rate of
success in getting nullity decisions. As many as 90.9 per cent of the referrals which
concluded in a court decision have been made by the parliamentary opposition.
Although the president, with a success rate of 85.7 per cent, was the most success-
ful in having laws nullified, the largest opposition parliamentary group also won
68.5 per cent of its cases.
C. Reasons for Referral
Four types. What are major reasons for referral? Which reasons for referral are
more likely than others to be accepted by the court?  Referral texts contain a “state-
ment of reasons” written by referring authorities arguing which part of the law in
question violates which part of the constitution and why. The author will thus be
able to categorize reasons for referral by the article of the constitution that the
statement of reasons cited.
The Turkish Constitution consists of a preamble and seven parts. Each part con-
sists of several chapters, each of which contains articles. The articles are numbered
consecutively from 1 to 177 throughout the constitution. Table IV shows the rea-
sons, aggregated by part(s) of the constitution. These are (1) general rules, (2)
14 It is possible for one-fifth of the parliamentarians which include members of the government party
to refer to the court, as happened in 1994 under the coalition government of the True Path Party and
the Social Democratic Populist Party.  But such cases are very rare, and during the 1984–92 period
the author did not find any.
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TABLE IV
REFERRAL REASONS AND COURT DECISIONS, 1984–92
Court Decisions
Nullity Rate
(A)/(C)
(%)
General rules 159 58 217 73.3
Preamble
Part 1: General Rules (1–11)
Rights and duties 116 36 152 76.3
Part 2: Basic Rights and Duties (12–74)
Separation of powers 126 61 187 67.4
Part 3: Organs of the Republic (75–160)
Others 14 26 40 35.0
Part 4: Fiscal and Economic Clauses (161–73)
Part 5: Miscellaneous Provisions (174)
Part 6: Provisional Articles
Part 7: Final Provisions (175–77)
Total 415 181 596 69.6
Source: Compiled from [10, various issues] by the author.
Note: Excluding referrals by the president.  Entries are the numbers and percentages of TC
articles.
Total
(C)
Nullity
(A)
Rejection
(B)
rights and duties, (3) separation of powers, and (4) others, for the opposition’s
referrals and the court’s decisions during the 1984–92 period.
Among the four reasons for referral, (1) general rules, (2) rights and duties, and
(3) separation of powers are more likely to induce nullity decisions than (4) others.
The chi-square test, when applied, shows that the nullity rate (411 out of 556, or
73.9 per cent) for the aggregate of the first three reasons was higher than the nullity
rate (14 out of 40, or 35.0 per cent) for the fourth reason at a 0.000 level of signifi-
cance. Among the first three reasons for referral, however, there was no statistical
difference in their nullity rates. The chi-square test, when applied to the above data,
could not reject the null hypothesis that the nullity ratio differed among (1) general
rules, (2) rights and duties, and (3) separation of powers.
More specifically, reasons for referral which concluded in nullity decisions can
be broken down into articles, or chapters of articles, cited from the constitution.
Tables VI and VII aggregate articles by chapter while Table V shows articles per se
since these articles (excluding the Preamble) belong to single chapters.
General rules. Regarding general rules (Table V), the most frequent article cited
in statements of reasons is the “Characteristics of the Republic,” which states the
secular, social, and democratic nature of the republic. The next two most frequently
cited articles are “Equality before Law” and “Legislative Power.” In other words,
Reasons for Referral and Part(s)
of TC (Article Numbers of TC)
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TABLE V
GENERAL RULES: REFERRAL REASONS FOR NULLIFIED LAWS, 1984–92
Articlesa Number
Characteristics of the Republic 33
Equality before Law 24
Legislative Power 24
Preamble 20
Fundamental Aims and Duties of the State 20
Sovereignty 16
Judicial Power 9
Executive Power and Functions 6
Supremacy and Binding Force of the Constitution 5
Integrity of the State, Official Language, Flag,
National Anthem, and Capital 2
Total 159
Source:  Compiled from [10, various issues] by the author.
a Including the Preamble.
15 It is logically true that the “General Provisions of Fundamental Rights and Duties,” which are
designed to limit the extensive rights acknowledged to the individual in the chapter of “Rights and
Duties of the Individual,” can be reasons for protecting the rights of the individual.  In many
practical cases, however, it is difficult to use the chapter of the “General Provisions of Fundamen-
tal Rights and Duties” to defend the rights of the individual since that chapter allows the restriction
of rights of the individual in such highly abstract terms as in TC, Article 13: “Fundamental rights
and freedoms may be restricted by law, in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Constitution,
with the aim of safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation,
national sovereignty, the Republic, national security, public order, general peace, the public inter-
est, public morals and public health, and also for specific reasons set forth in the relevant articles of
the Constitution” [1, p. 7].
those principles of the democratic rule of law as well as of law-making and imple-
mentation are major reasons which will bring forth nullity decisions.
Rights and duties. Regarding rights and duties (Table VI), the most frequent
chapter of articles cited is “Rights and Duties of the Individual.” This chapter in
fact consists of articles related only to rights except the article related to penalties.
This is primarily because the structure of the constitution is such that whereas the
chapter of “Rights and Duties of the Individual” lists the rights accrued to the indi-
vidual, the chapter of “General Provisions of Fundamental Rights and Duties” con-
ditionally restricts those rights.15 The large number of cited articles related to
“Rights and Duties of the Individual” thus seems to suggest the importance given
in constitutional review to the rights, rather than the duties, of the individual.
Separation of powers. Regarding separation of powers (Table VII), the most
frequent chapter of articles cited is the “Executive.”  The main concern of the par-
liamentary opposition seems to be that the executive should function within the
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TABLE VI
RIGHTS AND DUTIES: REFERRAL REASONS FOR NULLIFIED LAWS, 1984–92
Chapters and Articles Number
Rights and Duties of the Individual 50
Principles Relating to Offenses and Penalties 8
Freedom to Claim Rights 6
Freedom of Religion and Conscience 5
Right to Use Mass Media Other than the Press Owned by
Public Corporations 4
Right of Property 4
Personal Inviolability, Material, and Spiritual Entity
of the Individual 3
Freedom of Thought and Opinion 3
Freedom of Science and Arts 3
Prohibition of Forced Labor 2
Freedom of Residence and Movement 2
Freedom of the Press 2
Right to Publish Periodicals and Non-periodicals 2
Guarantee of Lawful Judge 2
Others 4
General Provisions of Fundamental Rights and Duties 24
Restriction of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 18
Nature of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 2
Prohibition of Abuse of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 2
Others 2
Social and Economic Rights and Duties 22
Utilization of the Coasts 3
Health Services and Conservation of the Environment 3
Conservation of Historical, Cultural, and Natural Wealth 3
Expropriation 2
Right and Duty to Work 2
Others 9
Political Rights and Duties 20
Right to Vote, to Be Elected, and to Engage in
Political Activity 6
Forming Parties, Membership, and Withdrawal from
Membership in a Party 6
Obligation to Pay Taxes  6
Principles to Be Observed by Political Parties 2
Total 116
Source: Compiled from [10, various issues] by the author.
limits of duties and authorities defined by the constitution. Also in the chapter of
the “Judiciary” the opposition cited articles which prevented intervention into the
judiciary, especially by the executive, by providing for the functional as well as
recruitment independence of the judiciary and the supremacy and binding force of
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TABLE VII
SEPARATION OF POWERS: REFERRAL REASONS FOR NULLIFIED LAWS, 1984–92
Chapters and Articles Number
Executive 53
Provisions Relating to Public Servants:
General Principles 13
Local Administration 6
Integral Unity and Public Legal Personality of the
Administration 4
Radio and Television Administration and News Agencies
with State Connection 4
President of the Republic: Duties and Powers  3
Administration: Recourse to Judicial Review 3
Duties and Responsibilities, and Guarantees during
Disciplinary Proceedings 3
President of the Republic: Oath 2
Formation of Ministries and Ministers 2
Declaration of a State of Emergency on Account of
Widespread Acts of Violence and Serious
Deterioration of Public Order 2
Rules Relating to the States of Emergency 2
By-laws 2
Others 7
Judiciary 41
Independence of the Courts 7
Decisions of the Constitutional Court 7
Judges and Public Prosecutors 5
The Constitutional Court: Functions and Powers 4
Audit Court 4
Security of Tenure of Judges and Public Prosecutors 2
The Constitutional Court: Organization 2
The High Court of Appeals 2
Council of State 2
Others 6
Legislature 32
Authorization to Enact Decrees Having the Force of Law 11
Functions and Powers of the Grand National Assembly
of Turkey: General Provisions 9
Introduction and Debate of the Laws 5
Others 7
Total 126
Source: Compiled from [10, various issues] by the author.
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the court decision.  In the chapter of the “Legislature” the opposition cited those
articles stipulating that legislative power lies in Parliament or that the power to
issue a decree having the force of law will be delegated for a limited period and
sphere to the Council of Ministers by Parliament upon the passage of the empower-
ing law.16
IV. CASES OF GOVERNMENT DEFEAT: NULLIFIED LAWS
What kind of laws are opposed most vehemently by the parliamentary opposition
and which are successfully nullified by the court? More specifically, does the par-
liamentary opposition refer to the Constitutional Court technical or nominal de-
fects in the law with the primary intention of embarrassing the government? Or  do
they refer to the court substantive problems found in the law? To answer these
questions, the author first classified the nullified laws into three groups by the type
of referral reasons which were explained in the previous section, and then chose
those laws referred to the court for the three most frequent referral reasons which
were later nullified (Tables VIII–X). They are, in each of the three types of referral
reasons, those laws or amendment laws which brought about major reaction  from
the parliamentary opposition and which were eventually nullified. In all nine cases
the court approved at least one of the referral reasons for unconstitutionality. All
nine laws were legislated when the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi), economi-
cally liberal and politically conservative, was in government (1983–91).
A. General Rules
Police-law amendment. Table VIII shows those nullified laws which were re-
ferred to the court for reasons related to the general rules of the constitution. In
legislating the Law for Amending the Law of the Power and Duties of the Police,
the Motherland Party government aimed at strengthening police authorities in or-
der to increase internal security. The Motherland Party government’s keen interest
in a strong and effective police is reflected in the fact that as of 1993 out of the total
twenty-four amendments made to the original law since its legislation in 1934,
thirteen amendments were made by the Motherland Party government [9].
Some of the articles of the police-law amendment were judged to violate TC,
Articles 2 and 5 for allowing the police to restrict for its own subjective reasons the
freedom of the individual and to intervene in private life for the sake of public
order, which was defined in highly abstract terms. Other articles of the amendment
also violated TC, Article 10 since they allowed the police to interrogate those sus-
16 The cabinet is able to issue a decree having the force of law upon the legislation of an empowering
law which defines the purpose, scope, principles, and operative period of the decree (TC, Article
91).
THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES332
TABLE VIII
LAWS NULLIFIED: GENERAL RULES
Laws (Review Number)a Referral Reasonsb
Law for Amending the Law of the Power and P, 2, 5, 6, 7,
Duties of the Police (1986/27) 8, 9, 10, 11
Law for Amending the Electoral Law and the P, 2, 5, 6, 7,
Political Parties Law (1988/18) 10, 11
Law for Amending the Land Registration Law P, 2, 3, 7, 8,
and the Village Law (1986/24) 9, 11
Source: Compiled from [10, various issues] by the author.
a The number given by the Constitutional Court to its decision.  The first four digits represent
the year and the next two digits the cumulative number of decisions.
b Articles of the constitution which the law in question allegedly violated.  Excluded are
referral reasons which were not related to the general rules.  Underlined are referral reasons
approved by the court in its nullity decision.  “P” represents the Preamble.
pects already under arrest or in prison for other allegations, thus denying equality
before the law for those who were arrested or imprisoned compared to those who
were not.
Electoral-law and political-party-law amendment. The Law for Amending the
Electoral Law and the Political Parties Law changed the date of general local elec-
tions from “once every five years,” stipulated both by the constitution and the elec-
toral law, to “an October Sunday in every five years.” Given that the most recent
general local elections were held on March 25, 1984, the amendment required the
next general local elections to be held in either October 1988 or October 1989,
which would deviate by half a year from the constitutionally required date of
March 25, 1989. In addition, the amendment provided that “which Sunday of the
October” would be determined not by law but “by a Parliament decision.”
Some articles of the amendment law were judged to violate TC, Articles 2, 5,
and 6 since the above changes neglected the principles of the rule of law, democ-
racy, and the supremacy of the constitution. Other articles of the law were also
judged to breach TC, Article 11 since it violated the right to vote as well as to be
elected by making it procedurally difficult for independent candidates to run for
and to be elected in mayoral elections.
It cannot be completely denied that the amendment laws originated mainly from
the dimming electoral prospects for the Motherland Party. Although in the 1983
general election the Motherland Party recorded a landslide victory with 45 per cent
of the votes and 53 per cent of the seats, in the following 1987 general election
while still keeping a parliamentary majority, it saw the votes it gained fall to 36 per
cent. This was partly because the mass public felt it could no longer bear the burden
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TABLE IX
LAWS NULLIFIED: RIGHTS AND DUTIES
Laws (Review Number)a Referral Reasonsb
Law for Amending the Law of the Power and 12, 13, 17, 19,
Duties of the Police (1986/27) 20, 21, 23, 26,
27, 35, 37, 38
Law for Amending the Law for Protecting the 13, 14, 17, 25,
Children from Hazardous Publications and for 26, 27, 28, 29,
Amending the Turkish Penal Law (1987/04) 31, 38, 63
Law for Combating Terrorism (1992/20)c 13, 17, 19, 26,
27, 35, 36, 38
Source: Compiled from [10, various issues] by the author.
a The number given by the Constitutional Court to its decision.  The first four digits represent
the year and the next two digits the cumulative number of decisions.
b Articles of the constitution which the law in question allegedly violated.  Excluded are
referral reasons which were not related to rights and duties.  Underlined are referral reasons
approved by the court in its nullity decision.
c Legislated in 1991.
of the economic stabilization policy which the Motherland Party government had
taken over from the outgoing military government in 1983.
It was clear that in the constitutionally prescribed March 1989 general local elec-
tions the voting rate for the Motherland Party would decrease further. Thus it
seems that the party tried to minimize the erosion of its public support by carrying
out the pending general local elections half a year earlier without explicitly violat-
ing the constitution. The Motherland Party would also have liked to obstruct inde-
pendent candidates, who were more powerful in local than general elections. The
Motherland Party was formed in 1983 and thus had yet to develop its local organi-
zational base.
Land-law and village-law amendment. The Law for Amending the Land Regis-
tration Law and the Village Law was judged to violate TC, Article 7 since it in-
fringed upon the legislative power of Parliament by conferring on the cabinet the
power to decide exceptional conditions under which the rules for estate sales to
foreign countries or foreigners could be implemented. By this amendment the
Motherland Party government would have not only exercised enormous patronage
for land sale approvals but also consolidated political support from the rentier sec-
tor which had been developing rapidly since 1980 under economic liberalization.
B. Rights and Duties
Police-law amendment. Table IX shows those nullified laws which were referred
to the court for reasons related to rights and duties. Certain articles of the Law for
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Amending the Law of the Power and Duties of the Police (the same law as in Table
VIII) was also judged to violate TC, Articles 13 and 19 since an excessive increase
in police authority might well lead to the infringement of basic human rights. As
the author has seen above, the amendment also violated those general rules related
to basic human rights.
Publication-law and penal-law amendment. The Law for Amending the Law for
Protecting the Children from Hazardous Publications and for Amending the Turk-
ish Penal Law was intended to tighten control over legally undefined “hazardous”
publications17 for youth under the age of eighteen. Some of the articles of the
amendments were judged to violate TC, Article 28 for endangering the freedom of
publication since they imposed three times greater penalty on a repeated “crime.”
The amendments were legislated just prior to the November 1987 early general
election, which points to a possible link between the amendments and a political
appeal to the religious segment of the society.
It is well known that the largest faction of the Motherland Party consists of reli-
gious conservatives some of whom were former members of the defunct religious
National Salvation Party (Millî Selâmet Partisi).18 The first chairman and former
prime minister, Turgut Özal, was a believer in the Naks¸ibendi sect of Sunni Islam.
The party thus had a strong constituency in religious voters. The party, however,
did not monopolize the religious votes but was competing for them with the more
religious Welfare Party (Refah Partisi). Eventually in the 1987 general election, the
Motherland Party is believed to have succeeded in receiving block votes from most
of the domestic Islamic groups.
Anti-terrorism law. The Law for Combating Terrorism conferred the state with
greater authority to prosecute individuals and groups suspected of committing “ter-
rorism.” The suspects would also be tried in the State Security Court instead of the
normal criminal court. This law, introduced in reaction to the increasing militancy
of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), aroused fears and criticism within the soci-
ety that the law in the name of combating terrorism violated basic human rights.
This law, which was unpopular because of its anti-democratic nature, later became
one of the first to be amended under “democratic reform” by the coalition govern-
ment formed between the True Path Party (Do âgru Yol Partisi) and the Social
Democratic Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkc¸ı Parti), which succeeded the
Motherland Party government following the October 1991 early general election.
Different articles of the law were judged: (1) to violate TC, Articles 13 and 36
since they limited to three at most the number of attorneys a defendant was allowed
17 Both the original and the amended laws provided that publications subject to this law would be
decided by the committee dominated by representatives of government ministries.
18 In 1981 the military government disbanded the party together with the other political parties.
Following the transition to civilian rule in 1983, the party was revived with a new name, the
Welfare Party.
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TABLE X
LAWS NULLIFIED: SEPARATION OF POWERS
Laws (Review Number)a Referral Reasonsb
Law for Approving the Decree Having the Force 91, 125, 138,
of Law for Amending the Law of Judges and 139, 140, 143,
Prosecutors and Amending the Law of the 144, 145, 146,
Education Center for Judge and Prosecutor 148, 154
Candidates (1990/30)
Decree Having the Force of Law for Amending 87, 91, 103,
the Municipality Law (1989/07) 104, 127, 128
138, 153
Law for Amending the Empowering Law (1990/02) 87, 91, 113,
128, 130, 133
Source: Compiled from [10, various issues] by the author.
a The number given by the Constitutional Court to its decision. The first four digits represents
the year and the next two digits the cumulative number of decisions.
b Articles of the constitution which the law in question allegedly violated.  Excluded are
referral reasons which were not related to separation of powers.  Underlined are referral
reasons approved by the court in its nullity decision.
to have while the Turkish penal procedural law put no such limit, thus denying the
freedom of claiming one’s own rights; (2) to violate TC, Article 17 since they
provided that those who committed a crime during the course of implementing the
anti-terrorism law could be indicted without being arrested, thus allowing those
who committed torture to be left at large until they were convicted; and (3) to
violate TC, Articles 35 and 38 since they allowed the state to confiscate the prop-
erty of the criminal thus denying his/her property rights as well as breaching the
constitutional prohibition of confiscatory penalties in particular.
C. Separation of Powers
Law for judges-and-prosecutors-law amendments. Table X shows those nul-
lified laws which were referred to the court for reasons related to the separation of
powers. One article of the Law for Approving the Decree Having the Force of Law
for Amending the Law of Judges and Prosecutors and Amending the Law of the
Education Center for Judge and Prosecutor Candidates was judged to violate TC,
Article 91, which regulated decrees having the force of law. The court pointed out
that the Empowering Law which extended the duration of a previously legislated
Empowering Law on which the above decree depended had been nullified by the
Constitutional Court on the day the Law for Approving the Decree, after being
legislated, had been put into effect. Another article of the law was judged to violate
TC, Articles 138, 139, and 140 since it changed the ongoing written qualifying
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examination of the Education Center for Judge and Prosecutor Candidates to an
oral examination, thus neglecting the independence of the courts, protection of
judges and prosecutors, and legal provisions required for the judge and prosecutor
professions.
Decree for a municipality-law amendment. The Decree Having the Force of Law
for Amending the Municipality Law increased central government control over
local government in the case of mayoral vacancy. Before the amendment was
made, a mayoral post vacated before the end of tenure would be filled by a tempo-
rary mayor (until the next local election) by and from the members of the municipal
council within three months. After the amendment, however, the temporary mayor
was appointed by the Interior Minister from the municipal council members. The
amendment was judged to violate TC, Article 91 since the relevant empowering
laws, which the decree relied on, neither encompassed the above Municipality Law
nor alluded to any changes in the structure of the local government. It was thus the
Motherland Party government’s hasty bypassing of the conventional legislative
process that was stopped short by the nullification of the law.
The government’s haste, however, seems to explain the primary intentions be-
hind this amendment. The amendment was legislated in July 1988, less than nine
months before the general local elections in March 1989. The government, which
in the 1987 general election saw its popular support decreasing, as was already
mentioned, had to legislate this amendment in time to compete more advanta-
geously in the general local elections. The party holding the mayoral post would be
able to use for its electoral campaign the organization and personnel of the munici-
pality as its political machine.
Empowering-law amendment for public sector salaries. Some of the articles of
the Law for Amending the Empowering Law were judged to violate TC, Articles
87 and 91 since the law empowered the cabinet to issue a decree having the force of
law on such an unurgent subject as the salaries of public servants. Other articles of
the amendment also violated TC, Articles 130 and 133 since they provided that the
government could decide the appointments and salaries of such public organiza-
tions as the Supreme Education Board and the Turkish Television and Radio Direc-
torate, the independence of which is constitutionally guaranteed. The nullity deci-
sion thus prevented the government from exercising discretionary power to change
the salaries of personnel in  the politically sensitive, and therefore legally indepen-
dent, public organizations.
Construction-law amendment. The Law for Amending the Construction Law
was judged to violate TC, Articles 128 and 129 since in addition to the governor
and the mayor, it authorized private construction/engineering firms to give a con-
struction permits. The Constitutional Court reasoned that such permits could be
issued only by the authority of public administration. It would have been possible
to argue that the implementation of the amendment would have virtually allowed
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the private construction sector to regulate itself, thus making it very difficult for the
central or local governments to regulate illegal construction.
D. Summary
In sum, the above laws were referred to the court for a large number of reasons to
be nullified mostly because these laws would either bring about grave conse-
quences for the state and society or serve the political expediencies of the party in
power. Thus, in general, when the parliamentary opposition strongly challenged
the constitutionality of a law, the opposition was dealing not with nominal defects
in the law but with substantive issues.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Summary. The Constitutional Court in Turkey, compared with its European
counterparts, can be characterized by its open access to the parliamentary opposi-
tion and by its high degree of independence from the executive branch of govern-
ment. This paper showed that these characteristics of Turkish constitutional review
provided a second chance for the parliamentary opposition to defeat government
bills. Under the 1982 constitution approximately ten abstract reviews were made
annually, out of which more than 70 per cent led to nullity decisions. This shows
that Turkey ranks among the highest in Europe in the number of referrals and nul-
lity decisions in abstract constitutional review. At the same time, of those nullity
decisions nearly 90 per cent had been referred by the parliamentary opposition. The
selective analysis of the laws wholly or partly nullified after being referred to the
Constitutional Court with the most extensive statements of reasons has revealed
that these laws have included articles which would have either had grave effects on
the state and society or served the political expediencies of the party in power.
Eroding the legislative process? Some may argue that constitutional review is
invalidating or at least eroding the legislative process in Turkey. The author be-
lieves, however, that it is difficult for the parliamentary opposition to abuse consti-
tutional review.  As the court is substantially independent of the executive branch
of government, so is it of the opposition in the legislature. The author has already
seen that the decreased number of referrals in the 1984–93 period did not lead to a
decrease in nullity decisions. The reverse would also be true. Therefore, it is not the
number of referrals but the constitutional dubiousness of laws that mostly deter-
mines the number of nullity decisions.
Limitations and implications. This paper is a preliminary attempt to place Turk-
ish constitutional review in comparative perspective as well as into the dynamics of
Turkish politics. The comparative attempt was limited mainly to presenting an in-
troductory framework for future research since data for other countries were either
seriously lacking or were hard to come by. Most of the newly democratized or
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redemocratized countries which sprang from the “third wave of democratization”
have established constitutional courts. This shows the universal recognition of the
importance of constitutional courts as a guarantor of democracy under the rule of
law. Thus, it will be necessary for a wide range of country specialists to come up
with original data for comparative studies sharing the same analytical framework.
In terms of Turkish political dynamics, more comprehensive studies will be needed
about shared or differing characteristics of reviewed as well as nullified laws. That
will be one of the ways for systematically analyzing the importance of constitu-
tional review in Turkish politics.
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